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CORRECTIVE JUSTICE                                               
FOR CIVIL RECOURSE THEORISTS 
SCOTT HERSHOVITZ*
I. 
 The central claim of civil recourse theory is undeniably true: tort 
is a system of civil recourse. To say that tort is civil is to say that it is 
peaceful rather than violent and that it is part of private law not 
public law. To say that tort provides recourse is to say that it allows 
plaintiffs to seek remedies from defendants. Whatever else one might 
think about tort, it is a peaceful means for private plaintiffs to seek 
remedies from defendants. Any theory of tort must acknowledge this 
fact, but no theory need treat it as important, and most do not. 
 John Goldberg and Ben Zipursky are outliers. They think the fact 
that tort is a system of civil recourse is very important. Indeed, they 
argue that it is the key to understanding both why we have tort law 
and why tort law has the rules that it does. They have developed a 
theory of the institution, grounded in a claim of political morality. 
According to Goldberg and Zipursky, victims of wrongdoing have a 
right to seek redress from those who have wronged them. In a civi-
lized society—one which restricts private violence—that right is held 
against the state, which must provide a civil avenue of redress for 
legal wrongs. Tort law is structured so as to implement this require-
ment.1 If a plaintiff shows that that the defendant has legally 
wronged her, a court judges the defendant liable, most commonly 
(but not only) for money damages. 
 Goldberg and Zipursky’s picture of tort has a familiar ring to it, in 
part because we have thus far said little to distinguish it from the 
corrective justice account that many philosophers champion.2 Accord-
* Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Jules Cole-
man, Daniel Halberstam, Don Herzog, Jill Horwitz, John Goldberg, Richard Primus, Bill 
Miller, Peggy Radin, Don Regan, Arthur Ripstein, Alex Sarch, Gil Seinfeld, David 
Uhlmann, and Ben Zipursky for helpful comments and conversations. I also benefitted 
from discussion with participants at the Symposium on Civil Recourse Theory at The Flor-
ida State University College of Law.  
 1. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV.
1625, 1643 (2002) (“The reason the court system makes available rights of action in tort 
cases is that the system is built on the idea that those who have been wronged are entitled 
to some avenue of recourse against the wrongdoer. But, in a civil society, private violence 
is not permitted, even where there has been a legal wrong. The state therefore ordinarily 
must make some avenue of recourse available to the victim. It does this through the 
courts, via the tort system.”). 
 2. In contrast, we have said enough to distinguish it from the economic account of 
tort law, which takes costs to be the organizing concept of the institution, not harms or 
wrongs. See Scott Hershovitz, Two Models of Tort (and Takings), 92 VA. L. REV. 1147 (2006). 
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ing to corrective justice theorists, tort law enforces duties of repair 
that arise in response to wrongdoing. It is fair to say that corrective 
justice theorists have not emphasized the fact that tort is a system of 
civil recourse.3 But that thought is easily accommodated by a correc-
tive justice account: Tort is a system of civil recourse in respect of 
claims of corrective justice.
 Or so one might think, but Goldberg and Zipursky do not. They 
present civil recourse theory as a competitor to the corrective justice 
account, not as a complement to it. The indictment has three counts. 
The first says that corrective justice cannot explain the diversity of 
remedies available in a tort suit.4 Corrective justice offers a neat 
explanation of compensatory damages, which may be fairly said to 
repair the loss a plaintiff suffered. But tort awards other sorts of 
damages—nominal and punitive—which may not be fairly said to fix 
anything, at least not if we take the labels seriously. On top of that, 
tort sometimes grants injunctive relief that is prospective rather 
than corrective. 
 The second charge in the indictment is that corrective justice fails 
to account for the proliferation of standing requirements in tort law.5
As Palsgraf teaches, a plaintiff must prove more than that the de-
fendant committed a wrong that caused her a loss.6 She must show 
that the defendant wronged her. Though some would dispose of this 
requirement in negligence, it is deeply entrenched throughout tort 
law.7 For example, a defamation plaintiff must show that the state-
ment she complains about was of and concerning her, not just that it 
was defamatory and caused her harm.8 Likewise, a fraud plaintiff 
must show that she was duped by the defendant’s misrepresentation; 
it is not sufficient to show that she was harmed when somebody else 
was fooled.9 If tort aimed at corrective justice, the civil recourse in-
dictment charges, it would hold defendants liable for all the losses 
caused by their wrongdoing, or at least those that were foreseeable; 
it would not limit liability through standing requirements.  
 The final count in the indictment alleges that corrective justice 
misconstrues the normative structure of tort.10 On the corrective jus-
 3. See Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 67, 100-03 (2010). 
 4. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 
695, 710-13 (2003). 
 5. Id. at 714-18. 
 6. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 7. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 15-40 (1998). 
 8. Id. at 17-18. 
 9. Id. at 18-19. 
 10. Zipursky, supra note 4, at 718-21. 
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tice picture, tort enforces a duty of repair that arises out of the de-
fendant’s wrongdoing. But tort does not hold that the defendant is 
under a duty to compensate the plaintiff until after judgment has 
been rendered against her. Elsewhere, the law marks the fact that a 
duty to pay damages exists before a suit to enforce it. Defendants in 
contract actions, for example, may be liable for prejudgment interest 
on the ground that payment should have been made at the time spec-
ified in the contract. Not so defendants in tort suits. Tortious wrong-
doing renders one liable to have a duty to pay damages imposed 
though a lawsuit, but the wrongdoing does not generate that duty 
directly, at least not so far as the law is concerned. 
 The success of the civil recourse indictment depends, in part, on 
how one renders the principle of corrective justice. For example, if 
corrective justice requires that society annul losses wrongfully 
caused,11 then all three charges may have some bite. If instead cor-
rective justice requires that wrongdoers repair losses suffered by 
those whose rights they have invaded,12 then the first and third 
charges might be troublesome, but the second is not. And, if correc-
tive justice is not centrally concerned with losses, but instead aims to 
restore a normative equilibrium disturbed by wrongdoing,13 then the 
first charge loses force insofar as noncompensatory remedies may 
help restore that equilibrium. 
 Though I think the civil recourse critique of the leading concep-
tions of corrective justice is in some respects misguided, I do not 
want to join up to the thrust and parry here. My aim in this Article is 
to show that there is a better conception of corrective justice than the 
ones that Goldberg and Zipursky target, that this conception of cor-
rective justice is untouched by the civil recourse critique, and that 
civil recourse is best understood as a corrective justice account of 
tort. In other words, I aim to explain corrective justice for civil re-
course theorists. 
 11. This was once Jules Coleman’s view, see Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the 
Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L. REV. 349, 365 (1992), and it may be his view once 
again, see Jules L. Coleman, Epilogue to Risks and Wrongs: Second Edition 30 (Yale Law 
School, Public Law Working Paper No. 218), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1679554. 
 12. This is the view that Coleman defends in JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS
198 (1992). 
 13. Versions of this view are defended by, among others, Ernest Weinrib and Arthur 
Ripstein. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 270 (1999);
ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 67 (1995). 
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II. 
 As I just indicated, there are several competing formulations of 
the principle of corrective justice. However, for our purposes, what 
the leading contenders share is more important than what separates 
them. John Gardner attempts to capture the commonality when he 
says that “[n]orms of corrective justice regulate the allocation of 
goods back from one person to another.”14 The idea that the domain 
of corrective justice is allocating back (as opposed to allocating full 
stop, which Gardner says is the domain of distributive justice) comes 
from Aristotle, who took corrective justice to be a matter of addition 
and subtraction to reverse wrongful transactions.15
 There are no doubt cases where doing corrective justice requires 
allocating back. Take a simple one: Tom steals Jerry’s ball. What 
does Tom owe Jerry? His ball is an obvious answer. But what if Tom 
breaks Jerry’s leg? Jerry still has his leg, so it can’t be allocated 
back. If Tom could unbreak Jerry’s leg, that would seem in order, 
and we might think of it as an allocating back of sorts. Healing Jer-
ry’s leg restores what he started with. But already we are one step 
removed from an allocation of a good back from one person to anoth-
er. Repair is not the same as return.  
 The trouble mounts. It is far from easy to unbreak a leg. They 
take time to heal, and there is almost always pain and inconvenience 
involved. We can’t allocate back the time lost, pain suffered, or in-
convenience endured. We can’t even repair them, the way we might a 
leg. And sometimes we can’t repair a leg, at least not as good as new. 
For all this, we are apt to think that Tom should compensate Jerry, 
and I’ve got no quibble with that. But compensation is another step 
removed from allocating back. It is not return or repair; when Tom 
compensates Jerry, Tom gives him something he never had before. 
 If corrective justice were simply a matter of allocating back, it 
would be a principle of vanishingly small scope, reserved for the rare 
case in which a transaction can be reversed. But there are a number 
of strategies available to anyone who wants to preserve a more ro-
bust role for an Aristotelian picture. The first step is to talk about 
Jerry’s “loss,” rather than his broken leg. The abstraction helps one 
to imagine that a gain of a similar magnitude will erase the loss, as if 
everything happens on a bank ledger. But broken legs don’t zero out. 
No sum of money returns someone who has been injured to the posi-
 14. John Gardner, What is Tort Law for? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 L.
& PHIL. 1, 14 (2011). Alternatively, he says that “[a] norm of corrective justice is a norm 
that regulates (by giving a ground for) the reversal of at least some transactions.” Id. at 10. 
 15. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 87-89 (Roger Crisp ed. & trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).  
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tion they would have been in had the tort not been committed, unless 
their injury is monetary.16
 After the abstractions come metaphors. According to the most fa-
miliar, Tom must pay whatever it takes to make Jerry whole (a cruel 
thought when Jerry has been dismembered). What does that mean? 
Economists have an answer: Tom must pay Jerry a sufficient sum of 
money to make him indifferent between the life he would have had 
his leg never been broken and the life he has now. Even if Tom can-
not put Jerry in the position he was in before, Tom can put him 
elsewhere on an indifference curve that includes that point. This is 
not a crazy thought. Sometimes there is a sum that leaves one indif-
ferent to an injury, especially when repair or replacement are genu-
ine options. But only a person whose life has never been touched by 
tragedy could think indifference a sensible aim when we are dealing 
with devastating injuries or serious violations. What is the sum of 
money that would make one indifferent to having been raped? Or to 
the death of one’s spouse? Or to the loss of one’s sight? Money can do 
many things—pay for therapy, rehabilitation, home renovation, va-
cation, distraction, antidepressants, and sedatives. Sometimes, mon-
ey may even allow the victim of a serious injury to build a life she 
would not trade for the one she had before. But an unwillingness to 
go back to the way things were does not signal indifference to the 
injury one suffered.17 You can fill your life with new joys, yet still 
miss those beyond your reach. Even when moving on is better than 
moving back, a life not led may always be a source of regret. The 
thought that people who suffer devastating injuries or serious viola-
tions can be made whole is a comforting one, but there is no reason to 
think it true.18
 16. Some think the right sum of money is what the plaintiff would have demanded as 
a price for submitting to the injury. But this is a nonstarter because tort injuries are suf-
fered involuntarily. We can ask what price a person would charge for permission to break 
her leg, but we cannot ask what price she would charge to have it broken without her 
permission, as permission is built into the sale. 
 17. Is there an equivocation here? Maybe. The answer depends on whether econo-
mists use “indifference” as a technical term with a stipulated definition, or whether they 
intend indifference curves as an interpretation of our ordinary notion of indifference. I 
treat them as doing the latter because the case for using indifference curves to judge when 
a victim has been made whole depends on their capturing our ordinary notion of indiffer-
ence. To see this, imagine that economists called them B-curves instead of indifference 
curves. We would need an argument to explain why B-curves are appropriate tools for 
judging when people have been made whole. It is hard to imagine a plausible argument 
that does not rest on the claim that B-curves tell us when people are indifferent in the 
ordinary sense. 
 18. Incommensurability is part of the problem here, but only part. One may consider 
the quality of their life preinjury and postcompensation commensurable, such that one can 
say that one’s postcompensation life is at least as good or better that one’s preinjury life. 
And yet, one may still regret the injury, for the pleasures that it has left beyond one’s 
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 This raises a problem for a whole category of proposals about the 
content of corrective justice. If corrective justice requires annulling 
losses, we are out of luck, except when an injury involves property 
that can be returned or replaced. We can’t annul a rape or the death 
of a loved one, and calling them “losses” doesn’t change that. We are 
also out of luck if corrective justice requires that we repair losses, 
rather than annul them. What sort of repair can we offer the plaintiff 
whose injury is terminal cancer? If we face the problem honestly, the 
answer is none, at least not for his cancer. However, that is not a 
happy answer, so it is tempting to seek refuge in abstraction and 
metaphor, where we can make the poor man whole even as doctors 
cut bits of him away. 
 This is not a minor quibble. The cases that cause trouble for the 
Aristotelian picture are far more common than cases where alloca-
tion back is possible. But even the simple case we started with—Tom 
steals Jerry’s ball—is not nearly so simple as it seems. What about 
the time Jerry was without his ball? That cannot be returned or re-
paired or replaced. And, even if Jerry did not miss his ball, there is 
the matter of the stealing to deal with. If all Tom does is return Jer-
ry’s ball, he does just what we would expect him to do had he inno-
cently come to possess it. When Tom acts wrongly, we expect him to 
do more. At the least, we expect him to apologize, which suggests 
that even in the simple case, justice calls for something that is not an 
allocating back, but rather a giving of something new. 
 Many philosophers would parse this differently. They would say 
that returning the ball is a matter of corrective justice, but apologiz-
ing is not, even though it may be morally obligatory.19 I do not see 
the attraction of this view, except to the extent it helps preserve an 
allocating back picture of corrective justice, which is in any event 
misguided. There are many modes of putting wrongs right (return-
ing, repairing, replacing, compensating, apologizing), and they are 
deeply intertwined with one another. In some circumstances, a sin-
                                                                                                                  
reach, or for the pains with which it forces one to live. Even if one thinks that everything 
of value is commensurable, there is no reason to think that agents should be indifferent 
between different allotments of pleasure and pain so long as they sum to the same. As Don 
Herzog puts it, an agent indifferent to the composition of the pleasures and pain that con-
tribute to her utility is either “willfully blind or crazy.” DON HERZOG, WITHOUT FOUNDA-
TIONS: JUSTIFICATION IN POLITICAL THEORY 125 (1985). On incommensurability and correc-
tive justice, see Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 
56 (1993). 
 19. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 12, at 329 (“The particular duty [corrective justice] 
imposes is to repair the loss. There may be other agent-relative reasons for acting that 
arise as a consequence of wrongfully injuring another, for example, the duty to apologize 
or to forbear from future harming, but these are not derived from corrective justice.”); see
also Gardner, supra note 14, at 35 n.58. 
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cere apology obviates the need for compensation; in others, the fail-
ure to compensate undermines the credibility of an apology freely 
given. In light of these sorts of relations, it is natural to suppose that 
there is an overarching set of moral norms that govern the circum-
stances in which the various modes of putting wrongs right should be 
employed, and in what mixture. I am inclined to think that that is 
the domain of corrective justice. The mistake is trying to cram every-
thing into an Aristotelian model on which doing corrective justice 
requires reversing wrongful transactions. 
 There is, however, one last strategy to consider before we give up 
on the Aristotelian picture. According to Ernest Weinrib, it is a mis-
take to focus on material losses, like Jerry’s broken leg. In his view, 
corrective justice responds to normative gains and losses, which may 
or may not coincide with their material brethren, but are always pre-
sent in equal measure when one person wrongs another.20 This 
seems like a promising approach because it shifts the subject away 
from the source of our trouble—our inability to reverse or even repair 
many material losses. 
 To evaluate Weinrib’s suggestion, we need to get clear about what 
normative gains and losses are. Weinrib says that they are “discrep-
ancies between what the parties have and what they should have 
according to the norm governing their interaction.”21 Thus, one can 
suffer a material loss (i.e., a reduction in one’s holdings) without sus-
taining a normative loss; if I pay money in satisfaction of a debt, then 
I have less money than I did before but not less money than I ought 
to have. Likewise, one can obtain a material gain without sustaining 
a normative gain; this happens every time you get your paycheck. 
The converse cases hold too. You suffer a normative loss, but not a 
material loss, if your boss fails to issue your paycheck on time. And, 
you enjoy a normative gain without a material gain if your creditor 
fails to collect on a debt you owe. 
 With this distinction in hand, we can evaluate Weinrib’s sugges-
tion that the task of a court is to “undo the injustice of the correlative 
gain and loss”22 that attend wrongdoing. The loss side of the equation 
is not difficult to understand, at least when Tom steals Jerry’s ball or 
negligently breaks his leg. In both cases, Jerry loses something to 
which he was entitled; he has both a material loss and a normative 
loss. Many people have thought it troublesome for the Aristotelian 
 20. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice, 44 DUKE L.J. 277, 
286 (1994) (“[C]orrective justice is concerned with the correlativity of normative, not mate-
rial, gain and loss.”). 
 21. Id. at 282-83. 
 22. Id. at 282. 
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picture that only in the first case—where Tom takes Jerry’s ball—
does Tom have a material gain. After all, Tom doesn’t acquire any-
thing when he breaks Jerry’s leg. But Weinrib says that corrective 
justice is concerned with the normative side of the equation, and that 
Tom has a normative gain in both cases. What is Tom’s normative 
gain when he breaks Jerry’s leg? Since Tom doesn’t enjoy a material 
gain, the only way in which he could have a normative gain is if in 
virtue of having broken Jerry’s leg, he now has more than he ought 
to have. And that’s just what Weinrib says has happened. Normative 
gains and losses, he says, are “surpluses and shortfalls not from 
what the parties had before the unjust act, but from what the parties 
ought to have in view of the requirements of corrective justice.”23 The 
idea is that once Tom breaks Jerry’s leg, he incurs a liability to Jer-
ry, and until he discharges it, he enjoys a normative gain.24
 This has a certain elegance to it, but it is circular. On Weinrib’s 
picture, corrective justice calls for undoing normative gains and loss-
es. What are the normative gains? They are the gains that corrective 
justice requires that we undo. Weinrib is attempting to solve the 
problem of the missing gain by fiat. Corrective justice itself creates 
the gain needed to offset the victim’s loss.25
 Even if we set the circularity aside, however, Weinrib does not 
redeem the Aristotelian picture. He explains why we should think a 
wrongdoer enjoys a gain which we can offset against his victim’s loss, 
but he doesn’t give us any reason to think we can do the offsetting. If 
corrective justice requires that a wrongdoer compensate his victim, 
then when he does so, his normative gain will be undone. But the 
victim’s normative loss will not be. The only way to undo a normative 
loss is to give a person what she was entitled to have in the first 
 23. Id. at 289. 
 24. See id. at 283 (“A party may realize . . . a normative gain but no material gain: if I 
negligently injure another, I am liable for my wrongdoing, but my resources have not been 
increased by the wrong . . . .”). 
 25. The loss in the broken leg case doesn’t pose the same problem because there is 
another norm against which we can judge that Jerry has less than he ought to—the norm 
that says Tom may not break Jerry’s leg. The same will be true of the gain in other cases. 
When Tom takes Jerry’s ball, for example, we can say that Tom has more than he ought to 
by reference to property norms. The circularity arises in cases in which a normative gain 
or loss can only be identified by reference to a norm of corrective justice, but that is a ra-
ther large class of cases. Indeed, Weinrib seems to think that all cases fit in that class, as 
he holds that the norms that establish primary duties—e.g., that Tom may not break Jer-
ry’s leg—are themselves norms of corrective justice. If so, the circularity runs even deeper. 
However, as Gardner points out, this aspect of Weinrib’s view is a “nonstarter,” as “[m]ost 
torts are not injustices at all, let alone corrective injustices. They are violations of norms 
of honesty, considerateness, trustworthiness, loyalty, humanity, and so on.” Gardner, su-
pra note 14, at 23-24 (discussing WEINRIB, supra note 13, at 76). 
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place, and rarely is that money.26 So how does Weinrib make sense of 
monetary damages for nonmonetary injuries? He employs a familiar 
metaphor. “Through the notion of damages,” he says, an “injury 
takes the form of something repayable: a monetary amount is debit-
ed against the defendant’s moral account with the plaintiff, and the 
payment of this sum discharges the defendant’s liability and wipes 
the ledger clean.”27 In the end, even Weinrib must flatten all injuries 
into losses so that they can be undone by a gain. 
 The difficulties with the allocating back picture of corrective jus-
tice are not news.28 Aristotle was aware of them.29 And even first-
year law students get that damage awards nearly never put anyone 
 26. One of the challenges in reading Weinrib is that he switches back and forth be-
tween an Aristotelian idiom, in which he talks about gains and losses, and a Kantian idi-
om, in which he talks about rights and duties. When writing in the Aristotelian idiom, 
Weinrib seems to agree that to undo a normative loss the defendant must give the plaintiff 
what she was entitled to have in the first place. He says that a defendant “is required to 
undo the consequences of his or her wrongful act by making good the [plaintiff’s] factual 
loss.” WEINRIB, supra note 13, at 129. But when he writes in the Kantian idiom, he allows 
that a plaintiff’s right might be restored by an award of damages that is the monetary 
equivalent of her injury. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Civil Recourse and Corrective Justice, 39 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 273 (2011). These are not two different ways of stating the same idea; 
awarding damages changes the consequences of the defendant’s wrongful act without un-
doing them. In any event, even Weinrib’s more flexible Kantian approach is bound to fail 
in any case in which the injury does not have a monetary equivalent.  
 27. Weinrib, supra note 20, at 288. 
 28. The best statement of many of them is in Radin, supra note 18, at 60. Radin ad-
dresses the challenges posed by incommensurability, and they are significant. However, it 
is important to see that incommensurability is only one source of trouble for the Aristote-
lian picture. Indeed, we would not reach the question whether, say, bodily integrity is 
commensurable with money if we were capable of turning back time to reverse injuries 
wrongfully caused. The move to compensation already constitutes recognition that we are 
not capable of allocating back. 
Arthur Ripstein is the rare corrective justice theorist who confronts the difficulty 
head on. He observes that “money is an imperfect means of making it as though an injury 
had never happened.” RIPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 58. And he acknowledges that money 
damages cannot make someone who has been physically injured whole. Id. at 116-17. But 
he nevertheless says that “insofar as they enable a plaintiff to adapt to his or her situa-
tion, money damages are an appropriate way of transferring the loss so that it becomes 
the injurer’s problem to decide how to deal with what is properly his or her loss.” Id. at 58. 
Here again, the abstraction obscures more than it illuminates. In most cases, the plaintiff 
must deal with her injury; it cannot be transferred to the defendant. Though damages 
may ease the defendant’s burden, the defendant who is ordered to pay them suffers a new 
loss; he does not acquire the plaintiff’s. 
 29. Consider this passage: “ ‘Gain’ is what it is generally called in such cases, even 
though in certain cases it is not the appropriate term, for instance, for one who struck 
another—and ‘loss’ for the one who suffered—but when the suffering is measured, it is 
called a loss for one party and a gain for the other.” Weinrib, supra note 20, at 279 (quot-
ing ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V.41132a11 (Ingram Bywater ed., 1894)). Weinrib 
takes this passage to confirm his view that Aristotle was interested in normative gains 
and losses. See id. at 279, 293. But it is hard to see why Aristotle would opine that “gain” 
is not an “appropriate term” for cases involving physical violence if he had a Weinrib-like view. 
I think Aristotle was acknowledging that his picture is artificial as applied to many cases. 
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in the position they would have been in absent the tort. Thus, dis-
cussions of corrective justice are chock full of qualifiers: 
Thus tort law places the defendant under the obligation to restore 
the plaintiff, so far as possible, to the position the plaintiff would 
have been in had the wrong not been committed.30
Corrective justice . . . is rendered rational . . . by the residual pos-
sibility . . . of restoring things, at least in some measure, to where 
they would have been had one not occasioned their loss.31
But these qualifiers are a dodge. They are a tempting dodge, to be 
sure, because there are cases where we can do things that approxi-
mate putting the plaintiff in the position she would have been in ab-
sent the tort. Jerry can get his ball back in replevin, and one who has 
suffered economic losses consequent on a physical injury can have 
the money restored to her bank account. But in an awful lot of cases, 
we can’t do anything like put the plaintiff in the position she would 
have been in had the wrong not been committed, so if we are doing 
that insofar as possible, we are doing it not at all. 
 What, then, are we doing when we compensate the defamation 
plaintiff whose reputation cannot be restored? Or the parent who has 
lost her child? Or the victim of a battery that was offensive but not 
harmful? Gardner acknowledges that, on the Aristotelian picture, we 
are not doing corrective justice. He says that damages for pain and 
suffering, emotional distress, bereavement, and the like “are not re-
parative in the strictest sense,” as they “are paid in respect of certain 
irreparable results or consequences of a tort.”32 He calls such damag-
es “quasi-reparative” because they look to be reparative though they 
are not, and thus allow “some of the placatory social meaning of ef-
fecting reparation” to “spill[] over.”33 On Gardner’s view, the point of 
such damages is to “assuage frustration, resentment, and other 
kinds of ill-feeling that afflict plaintiffs.”34 I do not doubt that dam-
ages assuage hurt feelings, and that may be a good reason to award 
them. But I dissent from the view that one has a claim that sounds 
in justice only if one’s injury can be repaired. And I dissent from the 
thought that compensating plaintiffs for pain and suffering or be-
reavement is a tack on, separate from the business of corrective justice. 
 The Aristotelian tradition of thinking about corrective justice re-
flects a deep desire to overcome what (to tweak a phrase from Rawls) 
 30. WEINRIB, supra note 13, at 135 (emphasis added). 
 31. Gardner, supra note 14, at 37 (emphasis added). 
 32. Id. at 47. 
 33. Id.
 34.  Id. 
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we might call the circumstances of corrective justice.35 We cannot un-
do what we have done. No matter how hard we wish that we could 
turn back time when a trigger is pulled or a driver hits a child, we 
cannot. The moment one person wrongs another, the wrong is part of 
our history, indelibly, and we must decide how to go on. We can ig-
nore the wrong, and often we do. We can try to ameliorate its effects. 
We can apologize. We can promise not to do it again. We can punish 
the wrongdoer. But the one thing we cannot do is return to the way 
things were.  
 The Aristotelian picture is seductive because it holds out the 
promise that we can go back. We can return, and when that doesn’t 
work, we can repair, and when that doesn’t work, we can replace, 
and when that doesn’t work, we can make whole by rendering indif-
ferent. It may be that we should do these things when we can. But 
the fundamental demand of corrective justice cannot be that we allo-
cate back, reverse wrongful transactions, or return a victim to the 
position she would have been in absent the wrong. All too often we 
can’t do anything like that, and we can never do it completely. Yet, 
we still must find a way to right wrongs. 
III. 
 Contemporary tort doctrine embraces the Aristotelian picture of 
corrective justice. Courts often say that “[t]he basic rule of tort com-
pensation is that the plaintiff should be put in the position that he 
would have been in absent the defendant’s negligence.”36 To be sure, 
the difficulties with the Aristotelian picture are not lost on lawyers. 
The Second Restatement of Torts observes that when a “tort causes 
bodily harm or emotional distress, the law cannot restore the injured 
person to his previous position.”37 Yet, the Restatement goes on to 
suggest that courts can achieve a “very rough correspondence”38 be-
tween damage awards and the extent of suffering, reflecting the 
 35. Rawls uses the phrase “the circumstances of justice” to refer to the conditions 
which make it necessary that we have principles of justice for dividing the benefits and 
burdens of cooperative social arrangements. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 126-27
(1971). Of course, he has distributive justice in mind. See id.
 36. Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1029 (Ala. 1993). Sometimes they remember to 
include a qualifier. See, e.g., Porter v. City of Manchester, 849 A.2d 103, 118-19 (N.H. 
2004) (“[T]he usual rule of compensatory damages in tort cases requires that the person 
wronged receive a sum of money that will restore the person as nearly as possible to the 
position he or she would have been in if the wrong had not been committed.”). 
 37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a, (1979). For an insightful analysis 
of the passage this statement is contained in, see Radin, supra note 18, at 69-71. 
 38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a, (1979). 
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dominant view that the point of tort damage awards is to make the 
plaintiff as near to whole as money can.39
 The idea that the purpose of tort damages is to make the plaintiff 
whole is a relatively recent development. As Goldberg has detailed, 
the make-whole metaphor entered tort law in the mid-nineteenth 
century.40 It was part of a shift from what Goldberg calls a model of 
fair compensation to a model of full compensation. Before the shift, 
tort damage awards were expected to reflect the character of the de-
fendant’s wrong, in addition to the severity of harm inflicted. Thus, 
fair compensation might have amounted to more or less than full 
compensation for a plaintiff’s loss.41 Lawyers in this era were apt to 
say that the point of tort damages was to provide the plaintiff satis-
faction,42 rather than restore her to the position she would have been 
in absent the tort.  
 Talk of satisfaction belongs to a different tradition of thinking 
about corrective justice, one whose animating metaphor is getting 
even rather than making whole. Getting even has a bad rap these 
days. Even Goldberg and Zipursky take care to distance themselves 
from the violent practices the phrase calls to mind.43 But the meta-
phor is not inextricably linked to violence. In fact, we regularly em-
ploy a notion of evenness today. Here’s a story that should sound fa-
miliar. Tom borrows money from Jerry. Sometime later Tom helps 
Jerry, let’s say by arranging a job interview. When Tom later tenders 
repayment, Jerry says, “Don’t worry about it, we’re even.” What does 
that mean? I take it that it doesn’t mean that Jerry has judged Tom’s 
services to be worth just the money owed, such that had the debt 
been a bit more he would have asked for a few dollars to make up the 
difference. I don’t even think it means that he has judged that Tom’s 
services are worth approximately the debt owed, with the difference 
 39. See John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compen-
sation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 435 n.2 (2006) (collecting supporting citations). 
 40. Id. at 447-62. 
41. See id. at 437, 458-59. 
 42. See id. at 440-45. 
 43. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and 
the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 602 (2005) (“Tort redress 
is not to be confused with vengeance. Vengeance is an unregulated response by which a 
victim seeks satisfaction directly and by the means of her choice. For good reasons, Anglo-
American law allows almost no room for it. Because it is unmediated, vengeance runs high 
risks of error, overkill, additional violence, and ongoing feuds, which tend to work against 
the resolution of disputes and to undermine civil order. Even when the law permits self-
help—e.g., recapture of chattels—it limits the privilege by requiring that it be done peace-
ably. Redress through law, as Locke and Blackstone understood, is a substitute for venge-
ance.”); see also Zipursky, supra note 7, at 85 (“Our society thus avoids the mayhem and 
crudeness of vengeful private retribution, but without the unfairness of leaving individu-
als powerless against invasions of their rights.”). 
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in either direction too small to trifle over. In other words, Jerry has 
not judged that he has been made whole in respect of the debt. Ra-
ther, he has declared the debt satisfied.  
 It is important to see that this declaration is not made true or 
false by some independent set of facts, like the market value of help-
ing someone get a job interview relative to the quantum of the debt. 
It is performative; by saying “we’re even,” Jerry is attempting to 
make it so.44 It might not work. Like all performatives, Jerry’s decla-
ration has felicity conditions which must be satisfied for the declara-
tion to succeed.45 If I approach two strangers on the street and say, “I 
now pronounce you husband and wife,” they are not thereby married. 
This is in part because I do not have the authority to marry them, 
and also because the rest of the ritual has not been performed. But 
if I said those words under the right conditions, the result would be 
a marriage.  
 What are the felicity conditions for Jerry’s declaration that he and 
Tom are even? There are many—e.g., Tom must be a person and not 
a cat—but given our present concerns, some are more important 
than others. First, Tom must not reject Jerry’s declaration. Why 
would Tom do that? Well, if Tom’s debt was large and his assistance 
slight, he might worry that Jerry is being canny: Tom will be left 
feeling that he owes Jerry a debt because he knows that neither one 
of them really thinks that they are even. But the debt will be difficult 
to pay because it is no longer monetized. Tom might think it better to 
pay cash while he can. Or, Tom might resist for the opposite rea-
son—because the services rendered were significant and the debt 
owed slight. In that case, he will be offended by Jerry’s proposal. He 
will pay, but he won’t help Jerry again. 
 This way of putting things makes it sound as if Jerry is valuing 
Tom’s services relative to the quantum of the debt, and of course he 
is. But it is important to see that Tom and Jerry are not even merely 
because Tom has done something that Jerry might plausibly regard 
as of sufficient value to satisfy the debt. They are not even until they 
jointly decide to regard one another as even. You can see why the 
performative is important if you vary the story. Suppose that Jerry 
simply accepts payment from Tom, and then later arranges for Tom 
and his wife to have dinner at a nice restaurant in thanks for Tom’s 
help with the interview. We wouldn’t for a moment think that the 
original debt had been paid when the interview was arranged, such 
that Jerry’s acceptance of payment was really an acceptance of an 
 44. On performatives, see J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson 
& Marina Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 1975). 
 45. See id. at 12-24. 
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overpayment, giving rise to a new debt that the dinner then paid off. 
Tom’s assistance does not satisfy the debt he owes Jerry unless and 
until they decide that it does. They do not find themselves even; Jer-
ry declares them even. 
 Of course, even if accepted, Jerry’s declaration is not sufficient to 
render him even with Tom. The declaration has other felicity condi-
tions, and what we just saw points to the most important: prior to 
the declaration Tom must have done something which could plausi-
bly count as grounds for it. That is vague, and I will try to flesh it out 
in moment, but it is not toothless. If Tom did nothing to benefit Jer-
ry, and Jerry said “we’re even” as an act of charity, he might succeed 
in forgiving Tom’s debt, but he would not render them even. Tom 
would still be indebted, just in a different way. 
 This shows that an act is required,46 but not just any act will do. 
There are loose conceptual constraints on what acts can serve as a 
ground for Jerry’s declaration. In addition to ruling out cases where 
Tom has done nothing, we can rule out cases in which the act in 
question harmed Jerry. For example, if Tom blocked Jerry from get-
ting a job, his interference could not serve as the ground for declaring 
his debt paid. Another conceptual constraint is more significant: 
Tom’s action must be proportional to the debt. As I said before, if 
Tom’s debt was significant and his assistance slight, Tom would like-
ly resist Jerry’s declaration, but even if he acquiesced, Tom and Jerry 
would not be even. This is a tricky condition to apply. Though the 
requirement that Tom’s act be proportional to the debt is a conceptu-
al constraint, the determinants of what counts as proportional are 
mostly social. Societies (and the people within them) diverge widely 
in what they value and how, but while there is a great deal of lati-
tude on such questions, presumably there are moral limits on what 
sorts of things people can properly regard as proportional.47
 There are more wrinkles to uncover here—e.g., there are social 
constraints that are not connected to proportionality48—but we have 
made enough progress to return to our quest to understand correc-
tive justice. Here’s the payoff: the fact that we can declare ourselves 
 46. Or something act-like. There are cases where forbearance will suffice. 
 47. Does the proportionality condition collapse us back into the Aristotelian picture? 
No. As we’ll see in a moment, a surprisingly wide range of corrective action can count as 
proportional, including much that does not fit Aristotelian descriptions of what corrective 
justice requires. And that is a good thing, because as we saw before, we often cannot do 
what the Aristotelian picture says we must. The proportionality condition limits what the 
performative can do, but the performative is necessary precisely because we cannot make 
sense of making whole, rendering indifferent, and the like. 
 48. To see one, shift the story: Imagine that Tom helps Jerry get a job interview, and 
Jerry, feeling indebted, offers to cut Tom a check. Tom wouldn’t dream of accepting, and he 
might be offended at the offer. In our society, there are debts that cannot be settled in cash. 
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even helps us cope with the circumstances of corrective justice. A 
wrongdoer cannot put his victim in the position she would have been 
in absent the wrong. But he might be able to do something which will 
allow them to declare themselves even. The something might be full 
compensation on an Aristotelian make-whole model. Whether com-
pensation of that sort will be sufficient ground for a declaration that 
the wrongdoer and victim are even will depend in part on culture 
and context. If it is not enough, it might be a good start. Often, how-
ever, putting the victim in the position she would have been absent 
the wrong will not be the thing that supports the declaration because 
nothing like that is possible, or nothing like that is appropriate. 
 Our judgments about what it takes to get people even are nu-
anced. Imagine again that Tom breaks Jerry’s leg. What would Tom 
have to do to allow Jerry to declare them even?49 It is hard to say 
without knowing something about Tom and Jerry’s relationship, and 
also just what Tom did. If Tom and Jerry are friends, and Tom was 
merely negligent in breaking Jerry’s leg, it is easy to imagine that a 
sincere apology will suffice. Of course, Tom may feel that he ought to 
do more than simply say that he’s sorry; he might feel like he ought 
to demonstrate it, by accompanying Jerry to the hospital, or bringing 
him food, or offering to take on chores around Jerry’s house while he 
recovers. It may even be that Tom would feel obligated to offer to 
pick up Jerry’s medical bills or other out-of-pocket expenses, but it is 
not hard to imagine Jerry declining that offer. Cash is an awkward 
medium of exchange in the context of a friendship.  
 In contrast, if Tom and Jerry are not friends, bringing Jerry food 
or doing chores around his house would be intrusive, and the offer to 
pay bills much less fraught. Jerry might accept, though even here it 
is easy to imagine him rejecting the offer. He might consider, among 
other things, how sincere Tom’s apology is, how much of a hardship 
it would be for Tom to assume his bills, and what his insurance will 
cover. The story is different yet again if Tom intentionally injured 
Jerry, as it is doubtful that absent coercion Tom would agree to do 
anything that might allow Jerry to declare them even, and it is dou-
bly doubtful that Jerry would be satisfied with an apology or even an 
offer to pay his expenses. 
 49. Tom and Jerry might get even through means other than an explicit declaration. 
If Tom apologizes and Jerry accepts, for example, Jerry’s acceptance might render them 
even, subject of course to many felicity conditions. Or the same might be accomplished 
implicitly, as when Jerry tells Tom, “I really appreciate your help, but you’ve gone beyond 
the call of duty.” Thus, the question I’ve posed in the text—what would Tom have to do to 
allow Jerry to declare them even—is a stand in for a more general question about what 
Tom must do to lay the conditions for some performative to render them even. 
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 Notice how different this calculus looks from the one associated 
with the Aristotelian picture. Tom’s bringing Jerry food does not re-
verse the wrongful transaction, allocate a good back from Tom to 
Jerry, or put Jerry in the position he would have been in absent the 
wrongdoing. At best, it mitigates one small burden Jerry faces, and it 
may not even be much help with that. But it’s just the kind of thing 
that would allow Jerry to declare that he and Tom are even, assum-
ing they started out as friends.50
 Of course, friends rarely face off in tort suits. The more interest-
ing cases for our purposes are those that involve strangers. And 
among those cases, the most interesting are those in which the par-
ties cannot reach an agreement on what will render them even, or do 
not want to try. To this point, I have focused on the conditions under 
which Jerry might declare that he and Tom are even. But Jerry is 
not stuck if Tom won’t play ball. He can try to get even in the classic 
sense: he can seek revenge.  
 This is the sort of thing that Goldberg and Zipursky are keen to 
distance themselves from. But it is important to understand that re-
venge is a way of coping with the circumstances of corrective justice. 
Once Tom has taken Jerry’s eye, Jerry cannot get it back. Taking 
Tom’s eye will not make Jerry whole, but at many times and places, 
it would have gotten him even, in his own eyes and in others’. How 
does revenge work that magic? It is not a performative, as it is not a 
speech act. But it is something close—a performance—subject to fe-
licity conditions much like those attached to Jerry’s declaration.51
Indeed, an act of revenge implicitly declares that the act renders the 
parties even. To serve as the ground for that declaration, the act it-
self must be proportional to the wrong. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that cultures that embraced revenge as a way of doing corrective jus-
tice had elaborate schemes for determining what constituted a pro-
portional response, starting with the most famous equivalence of 
all—an eye for an eye. 
 We have trouble thinking that way; it sounds unaccountably bru-
tal. But the violence was not pointless. Consider the following story 
from medieval Iceland, retold by Bill Miller: 
 50. Incidentally, this points to yet another reason to worry about the Aristotelian 
picture: its rigidity makes it difficult to see how it can account for the ways that corrective 
justice intersects with friendship. The Aristotelian picture provides a formula—reverse 
wrongful transactions—that does not take account of the relationship between the parties. 
But relationships make a big difference. We expect friends to put wrongs right rather dif-
ferently than strangers. 
 51. See AUSTIN, supra note 44, at 18-19 (observing that “infelicity is an ill to which all
acts are heir which have the general character of ritual or ceremonial”). 
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An Icelander named Skæring gets into a dispute with some Nor-
wegian merchants who have put into port in Iceland. They chop off 
his hand (merchants in those days were tough guys and were often 
themselves indistinguishable from Vikings). Skæring runs to his 
kinsman Gudmund, who is the local big man, and asks for help. 
Gudmund, with a group of men, rides to the Norwegian ship and 
demands that they compensate Skæring at a price he, Gudmund, 
shall name. The Norwegians agree, and Gudmund hits them with 
a very stiff price, almost as much as they would have been ex-
pected to pay had they taken Skæring’s life. They balk at paying 
the price named, despite having agreed beforehand to pay whatev-
er Gudmund adjudged to be appropriate; they argue that the hand 
of an undistinguished guy like Skæring should not carry such a 
high value and that Gudmund is simply gouging them, not adher-
ing to certain norms of reasonableness. Gudmund says, OK, forget 
it. I will myself pay Skæring the exact amount I adjudged you to 
pay, ‘but I shall choose one man from amongst you who seems to 
me of equivalent standing with Skæring and chop off his hand. You 
can then compensate that man’s hand as miserably as you wish.’ 
The Norwegians pay up.52
The Icelanders in the story did not regard taking an eye for an eye as 
the recipe for corrective justice, akin to the Aristotelian proposal that 
wrongful transactions should be reversed. For them, an eye for an 
eye was a failsafe. It provided a way of doing justice unilaterally, 
which was important in a world without tort law. But an eye for an 
eye was also what economists call a penalty default rule, encourag-
ing wrongdoers to take their victim’s claims seriously.  
 Much more seriously, Miller observes, than we do. We set the 
price for an eye after it has been taken, and that price never matches 
up to what the victim would have demanded in return for permission 
to take it. But, as Miller explains, the law of the talion got people 
that price: 
The talion structures the bargaining situation to simulate the hy-
pothetical bargain that would have been struck had I been able to 
set the price of my eye before you took it. It does this by a neat 
trick of substitution. Instead of receiving a price for the taking of 
my eye, I get to demand the price you will be willing to pay to keep
yours. It is not so much that I think your eye substitutable for 
mine. It is that you do. You will in fact play the role of me valuing 
my eye before it was taken out, and the talion assumes that you 
will value yours as I would have valued mine.53
 52. WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE 51 (2006).  
 53. Id. at 49-50. 
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Miller goes so far as to suggest that there were fewer one-eyed people 
wandering around in talionic societies than we have around here, 
because we sell our body parts at a discount.54
 I do not want to romanticize the talion. I just want to emphasize 
that as a way of coping with the circumstances of corrective justice, it 
had virtues. It also had costs—extraordinary costs. To start, the pen-
alty default only works if people think the threat is real. Every once 
in a while you have to gouge someone’s eye out or chop off a hand to 
maintain your credibility.55 Moreover, as Miller points out, we are 
surely wealthier for our willingness to sell body parts at a discount: 
“Imagine if the costs of replacing horses with automobiles meant that 
every road fatality gave the victim’s kin a right to kill or to extract a 
ransom measured at the value the person at fault placed on keeping 
his life!”56
 If modern life depends on our willingness to accept less in the way 
of compensation for injury, that may be reason enough to resolve 
disputes our way. But we should not flatter ourselves by thinking 
that our practices are the just ones, or even that we do justice better. 
We do justice differently, and not nearly so differently as we might 
suppose. One reason that Goldberg and Zipursky worry about re-
venge is the risk that it will lead to endless cycles of violence. “Be-
cause it is unmediated,” Goldberg says, “vengeance runs high risks of 
error, overkill, additional violence, and ongoing feuds, which tend to 
work against the resolution of disputes and to undermine civil or-
der.”57 But talionic societies had ways of keeping things from getting 
out of hand. One of the most important was the possibility of pre-
senting a dispute to a third party for a decision as to what would 
render a wrongdoer and a victim even. In Old Norse, the third party 
was called an oddman,58 but similar sorts of folks could be found 
wherever the talion was in use. Oddmen were a way of outsourcing 
the performative necessary to get the parties even, and their work 
was subject to a familiar felicity condition. As Miller explains, “the 
oddman’s job [was] to prevent getting even from getting out of hand 
by selling both parties on a plausible conception of evenness.”59
 54. Id. at 54-55. 
 55. Id. at 51-52. 
 56. Id. at 55. 
 57. Goldberg, supra note 43, at 602. 
 58. MILLER, supra note 52, at 9 (“For us, ‘being at odds’ means we are in the midst of 
a quarrel, and it meant that in Old Norse too; to resolve that quarrel you needed to get 
back to even. To do that you often had to bring in an oddman, a third party, to declare 
when the balance was even again if the law did not so provide or the parties could not 
agree among themselves as to how to strike it. You needed odd to get even or you would 
forever be at odds.”).  
 59. Id.
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 In opening this section, I said that contemporary tort doctrine 
embraces the Aristotelian picture of corrective justice. But the get-
ting even picture runs much deeper in tort’s veins. Indeed, tort law 
embodies it. We prohibit private violence as a response to wrongdo-
ing, but we maintain the institution of the oddman, in the form of 
judges and juries. When parties cannot negotiate their way back to 
even, we offer a judicial failsafe—compulsory process, followed by 
garnishment and attachment. A wrongdoer who will not bargain can 
be haled into court and forced to submit to a jury’s judgment as to 
what will render him even with his victim. Though courts are fond of 
saying that the plaintiff should be made whole, that is not in fact 
what juries are asked to do. They are typically instructed to award 
“fair and reasonable” compensation for a plaintiff’s injury,60 and in 
the cases where the wrongdoing is willful and wanton, they may go 
beyond, and award punitive damages too. 
 Our courts don’t do justice simply by moving money around. They 
do justice in the only way it can be done—performatively. Whether 
they succeed does not depend on whether they make plaintiffs whole 
or put them back where they once were. If it did, courts couldn’t do 
justice in most cases. Whether courts succeed in doing justice de-
pends on whether people regard the remedies awarded as sufficient 
to render prevailing plaintiffs even. That is, it depends on whether 
their performance is persuasive. Seen in that light, the Aristotelian 
rhetoric that pervades contemporary court doctrine may be a clever 
marketing strategy, but it is not much more. 
IV. 
 It should be clear by now that I do not think that civil recourse 
theory is a competitor to a corrective justice account of tort law. I 
think it is a corrective justice account, and a better one than the 
more familiar sort. I suspect that Goldberg and Zipursky deny this 
only because they mistakenly conflate the concept of corrective jus-
tice with the Aristotelian picture of it.61 After all, they stress that the 
 60. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 476 (2d 
ed. 2008). 
 61. Id. (“It is common for courts and commentators to describe the aim of a compen-
satory damage award as that of ‘making the plaintiff whole’ or ‘restoring the status quo 
ante.’ The picture evoked by these metaphors is that an award of money will erase the tort 
by fully compensating the plaintiff for all the harms associated with it. Indeed, an entire 
school of thought about tort law—corrective justice theory—is built around this metaphor. 
Following Aristotle’s conception, corrective justice scholars argue that tort law is best 
understood as concerned to take away whatever the tortfeasor has ‘gained’ from committing 
the tort (in terms of wealth, or the excess liberty he has implicitly claimed for himself) while 
restoring to the plaintiff whatever she has lost, thereby restoring a preexisting equilibrium.”). 
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key concepts in tort law are wrongs and recourse, and it is hard to 
see what recourse for wrongs would be, if not corrective justice.  
 Of course, given how deeply entrenched the Aristotelian picture is 
in contemporary thinking about corrective justice, it is fair to wonder 
whether we should let the Aristotelian theorists have the term and 
content ourselves to extol the virtues of getting even through civil 
recourse. I don’t think we should cede the term. As we have seen, 
there is a tradition that links corrective justice with getting even 
that is roughly as old and venerable as Aristotle, though it has fallen 
out of fashion.62 But even if corrective justice had always and only 
called to mind the Aristotelian picture, we should not hesitate to re-
ject it in favor of a better one. To say that something is a matter of 
justice is to say, at the least, that it is something worth pursuing, 
and indeed, that it should be an object of significant concern. That 
commitment is held more deeply than any particular views about 
how justice is done. And, it means that there is an important differ-
ence between saying that tort is a system of civil recourse and saying 
that it is a way of doing corrective justice. The first describes the in-
stitution; the second takes a step toward justifying it.  
 Is the getting even picture a better conception of corrective justice 
than its more familiar contenders? For all the reasons we have ex-
plored already, I think the answer is yes. But one might worry that I 
have merely traded one set of abstractions and metaphors for anoth-
er, and that the new metaphor is rather vacuous. That is right, but it 
is not a cause for worry: The emptiness of getting even is a virtue, 
not a vice. The problem with the Aristotelian picture is that it re-
treats to abstraction and metaphor because we cannot do the things 
it tells us we must—allocate back, reverse the wrongful transaction, 
or put the victim in the position she would have been absent wrong-
doing. Moreover, the abstractions and metaphors it resorts to are 
misleading. Injuries are flattened into losses, which we can annul, 
make good, or wipe clean, even as people hobble around. One virtue 
of the getting even picture is that it allows us to be honest about 
what we can and cannot fix. In a way, both the Aristotelian and get-
ting even pictures construe corrective justice as having the same 
aim—reaching a point where the victim’s claims to redress are fully 
satisfied. But the Aristotelian picture gives a rigid vision of what it 
takes to get there, whereas the getting even picture makes space for 
the contingency of our practices and the creativity necessary to cope 
with the circumstances of corrective justice. 
 62. There are also etymological connections between justice and evenness. See MIL-
LER, supra note 52, at 8-15. 
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 If I am right to think that civil recourse is a corrective justice ac-
count of tort, we should be able to dispatch the civil recourse critique 
of corrective justice rather easily. We can start with Goldberg and 
Zipursky’s first charge—that corrective justice accounts of tort ex-
plain compensatory damages but not the other remedies available in 
a tort suit. As we have seen, there is no special connection between 
compensatory damages and corrective justice. They are but one tool 
in a court’s kit for rendering parties even. To be sure, they are a par-
ticularly useful tool. It will often seem fitting for a wrongdoer to 
make good a victim’s pecuniary losses, so a judgment that includes 
compensatory damages may often make for a persuasive perfor-
mance. Moreover, money is a good medium of exchange among 
strangers, and the transfer of money is relatively easy to supervise. 
Therefore, it makes more sense to order a tortfeasor to pay compen-
sation than it does to require that he help out around the victim’s 
house. But in many cases, compensatory damages won’t do the trick, 
at least not fully. Sometimes, what a defendant has done is so egre-
gious that full compensation is not sufficient, and punitive damages 
are the order of the day. At other times, an injunction will be war-
ranted, perhaps to assure a plaintiff that the court will stand on her 
side if the defendant continues to infringe her right. And nominal 
damages allow a court to vindicate a plaintiff’s right by acknowledg-
ing that it has been infringed. When a plaintiff is not injured, noth-
ing more than public censure of the wrong may be necessary to get 
her even. Properly understood, all of the remedies courts offer in tort 
suits are tools for doing corrective justice. 
 We can make shorter work of the second count in the civil re-
course indictment of corrective justice. Goldberg and Zipursky ob-
serve that tort has standing requirements, such that a plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant wronged her, not just that she suffered a 
loss in virtue of his wrongdoing. This, they suggest, is odd if one 
thinks that the point of corrective justice is to make victims whole. 
But that is not the point of corrective justice. The point is to give 
people who have been wronged an opportunity to get even, and one 
has not been wronged unless one’s rights were violated. The standing 
requirements in tort law attempt to pick out people who have cause 
to get even. That is, they attempt to pick out those who have reason 
to resent, and not simply regret, a tortfeasor’s behavior. 
 Finally, we come to Goldberg and Zipursky’s observation that tort 
does not hold that a tortfeasor has a duty to compensate a plaintiff 
until after judgment is rendered. If one has an Aristotelian picture of 
corrective justice, this seems odd because the moment a wrong is 
committed, the wrongdoer has an obligation to put the victim in the 
position she would have been in absent the tort, or as near to it as he 
can. Tort will necessarily fail to do that if it does not award prejudg-
128  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol 39:107 
ment interest because the victim will be deprived of the time value of 
her money. Yet, tort doesn’t award prejudgment interest; it does not 
recognize a duty to pay damages until it imposes one.  
 Mysterious as this looks from an Aristotelian perspective, it is ra-
ther simple to explain. Getting even is performative. Until a court 
declares that a defendant must pay damages, the defendant is not 
under a duty to do it. The duty that arises at the moment of wrong-
doing is imperfect, or open-ended; a wrongdoer must take corrective 
action sufficient to support a declaration that the parties are even. 
Because that duty is imperfect, it might be satisfied in any number 
of ways. A court steps into the breach only when wrongdoer and vic-
tim can’t negotiate their way back to even on their own. A court im-
poses a solution, but it is a mistake to think that the court’s solution 
is a solution because it was all along the thing that should have been 
done. It is a solution because the court declares it one. 
V.  
 Let me close with a compliment. I have taken Goldberg and 
Zipursky to task for failing to see that they are, in fact, corrective 
justice theorists, but their sin is failing to know themselves, not fail-
ing to know tort law. Indeed, Goldberg and Zipursky have a sharper 
sense of tort than anyone has had in a long time, and they are right 
to think that the key to understanding tort is to see that it is a sys-
tem of civil recourse. We live in a society that has lost sight of this. 
Increasingly, tort is thought of as just another regulatory tool. There 
are many reasons for that, but bad tort theory has certainly played 
its part. Much of the blame should be laid at the doorstep of econo-
mists, but corrective justice theorists must take their share too.  
 The Aristotelian picture has caused much mischief. Its emphasis 
on offsetting victim’s losses contributes to the view that the point of 
tort law is to transfer money to tort victims. That is something tort 
law does, but it is not tort law’s point. Goldberg and Zipursky de-
serve much credit for putting us in a position to see that the point of 
tort is to give victims an opportunity to get even with wrongdoers. 
They have failed to realize that this makes them corrective justice 
theorists, but they are corrective justice theorists of the best sort. 
